1 Circonstances de l'accident; 2 Enquête; 3 Pilotes; 4 Suite; 5 Médias; 6 Références; 7 Articles connexes; 8 Liens externes; Circonstances de l'accident. Kiteyu. Approximately 2 hours into the flight, the flight crew, consisting of captain Ted Thompson, 53 and first officer William "Bill" Tansky, 57, first contacted the airline's dispatch and ma… [1] The crippled plane had been given a block altitude,[17] and several aircraft in the vicinity had been alerted by ATC to maintain visual contact with the stricken jet. [29][30], Captain Thompson and First Officer Tansky were both awarded the Air Line Pilots Association Gold Medal for Heroism, in recognition of their actions during the emergency. In interviews with the Alaska Airlines mechanic at SFO who last performed the lubrication it was revealed that the task took about one hour, whereas the aircraft manufacturer estimated the task should take four hours. The resulting upward movement of the horizontal stabilizer leading edge created an excessive upward aerodynamic tail load, which caused an uncontrollable downward pitching of the airplane from which recovery was not possible. Testing revealed that the non-standard tools ("restraining fixtures") used by Alaska Airlines could result in inaccurate measurements, and that it was possible that if accurate measurements had been obtained at the time of the last inspection, these measurements would have indicated the excessive wear and the need to replace the affected components. At 1619:24, the first officer asked, "you feel that?" The 2 pilots, 3 cabin crewmembers, and 83 passengers on board were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces. SEATTLE — On January 31, 2000, Alaska Airlines Flight 261 plunged into the Pacific Ocean off the coast of California. At the same time, the CVR also recorded sounds similar to loose articles moving around the cockpit. A lead mechanic at Alaska Airlines' Oakland maintenance facility reported maintenance short comings to the FAA fifteen months prior to the crash, and was placed on paid leave. [1] Insufficient lubrication of the components was also considered as a reason for the wear. This is the only time the award has ever been given posthumously. Consequently, although operation of the primary trim motor as part of troubleshooting attempts earlier in the flight did not release the jam, the torque created by the primary trim motor when the captain activated the primary trim system at 1609:16 apparently provided enough force to overcome the jam between the acme nut and screw. Alaska Airlines Flight 261 was a scheduled international passenger flight from Licenciado Gustavo Díaz Ordaz International Airport in Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco, Mexico, to Seattle–Tacoma International Airport in Seattle, Washington, United States, with an intermediate stop at San Francisco International Airport in San Francisco, California. Captain - Ted Thompson, 53 First Officer - William Tansky, 57 (not pictured) Flight Attendant - Allison Shanks, 33 Flight Attendant - Craig Pulanco, 30 Flight Attendant - Kristin Mills, 26. His recommendation was overruled by the next shift. Contributing to the accident were Alaska Airlines' extended lubrication interval and the Federal Aviation Administrationís (FAA) approval of that extension, which increased the likelihood that a missed or inadequate lubrication would result in excessive wear of the acme nut threads, and Alaska Airlines' extended end play check interval and the FAA's approval of that extension, which allowed the excessive wear of the acme nut threads to progress to failure without the opportunity for detection. [36] In April 2001, John Hay Elementary dedicated the "John Hay Pathway Garden" as a permanent memorial to the students and their families who were all killed on Flight 261. Alaska Airlines's extended end-play check interval and the FAA's approval of that extension, which allowed the acme-nut threads to deteriorate to the point of failure without the opportunity for detection. Another reported, "Yes sir, ah, I concur. Testimony from an FAA inspector regarding an extension granted in 1996 was that Alaska Airlines submitted documentation from McDonnell Douglas as justification for their extension. His claims triggered a criminal investigation that now includes the Jan. 31 crash of Alaska Airlines Flight 261, which killed 88 people. Il volo Alaska Airlines 261 era un volo dell'Alaska Airlines dall'Aeroporto Internazionale Lic. Vol Alaska Airlines 261. [1], In 2001, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) recognized the risk to its hardware (such as the Space Shuttle) attendant upon use of similar jackscrews. Alaska Airlines Flight 261. This was defined as "having a probability on the order of 1×10−9 or less each flight hour". In August 1999, Alaska Airlines put Liotine on paid leave,[25] and in 2000, Liotine filed a libel suit against the airline. Around that time, Alaska Airlines agreed to settle the libel suit by paying about $500,000; as part of the settlement, Liotine resigned. Victorien. A lead mechanic at Alaska Airlines' Oakland maintenance facility reported maintenance short comings to the FAA fifteen months prior to the crash, and was placed on paid leave. Alaska Airlines Flight 261 crash documentary - Cutting Corners. Définitions de Vol 261 Alaska Airlines, synonymes, antonymes, dérivés de Vol 261 Alaska Airlines, dictionnaire analogique de Vol 261 Alaska Airlines (français) Bouquets of flowers started arriving at the company's headquarters in SeaTac, Washington, the day after the crash. But maintenance, poorly done, will find a way to bite somewhere else. Neither the flight crew, nor company maintenance, could determine the cause of the jam. Subsequent DNA testing proved these claims to be false. The horizontal stabilizer stopped responding to autopilot and pilot commands after the airplane passed through 23,400 feet. At 1619:32.8, the CVR recorded the sound of two clicks similar to the sound of slat/flap movement. Twenty years ago, all 88 people on board Alaska Airlines flight 261 were killed when the MD-83 plunged into the Pacific Ocean after the flight crew reported a “jammed stabilizer.” Jeff Guzzetti led the NTSB Systems Group charged with the intricate reconstruction of the stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly. The upper mechanical stop was found attached to the splines of the acme screw, and the clamp bolt for this stop was in place. The investigation found that Alaska Airlines had fabricated tools to be used in the end-play check that did not meet the manufacturer's requirements. [28] The sundial casts a shadow on a memorial plaque at 16:22 each January 31. As the airplane passed through 23,400 feet, the acme screw and nut jammed, preventing further movement of the horizontal stabilizer until the initial dive. As it turns out, over two years prior, he had ordered the horizontal stabilizer jack screw on this aircraft be replaced. At 1619:36.6, the CVR recorded the sound of an "extremely loud noise" and the sound of background noise increasing, which continued until the end of the recording. Le vol 261 était réalisé par un MD-81. The names of each of the victims are engraved on individual bronze plates mounted on the perimeter of the dial. [22] Ultimately, the lack of lubrication of the acme-nut thread and the resultant excessive wear were determined to be the direct causes of the accident. FDR data indicated that, by 1619:45, the pitch angle had increased to -28°, and the airplane had rolled to -180° (inverted). On December 22, 1998, federal authorities raided an Alaska Airlines property and seized maintenance records. In the case of extended lubrication intervals, the investigation could not determine what information, if any, was presented by Alaska Airlines to the FAA prior to 1996. The jackscrew was constructed from case-hardened steel and is 22 inches (56 cm) long and 1.5 inches (3.8 cm) in diameter. [1], End-play checks were conducted during a periodic comprehensive airframe overhaul process called a C‑check. Also contributing to the accident was the absence on the McDonnell Douglas MD-80 of a fail-safe mechanism to prevent the catastrophic effects of total acme nut thread loss. Both pilots struggled together to regain control of the aircraft, and only by pulling with 130 to 140 pounds (580 to 620 Newtons) on the controls did the flight crew stop the 6,000 ft/min (1,800 m/min) descent of the aircraft and stabilize the MD-83 at approximately 24,400 ft (7,400 m). [44], Aviation accident over the Pacific Ocean in 2000, Inadequate lubrication and end-play checks, A block of altitudes assigned by ATC to allow altitude deviations. The thread failure was caused by excessive wear resulting from Alaska Airlinesí insufficient lubrication of the jackscrew assembly. The probable cause was stated to be "a loss of airplane pitch control resulting from the in-flight failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly's trapezoidal nut threads. Further, the airplane had descended to 16,420 feet, and the indicated airspeed had decreased to 208 knots. The NTSB noted that in July 2001, an FAA panel determined that Alaska Airlines had corrected the previously identified deficiencies. Those who lost loved ones when Alaska Airlines Flight 261 plunged into the Pacific Ocean off California have learned some hard, bitter truths in the 10 years since the crash. Six seconds later, the captain stated, "push and roll, push and roll." ​On September 26, 1997, the airplane entered a C check (which was completed on October 1, 1997) at the OAK maintenance facility, which included an end play check. Ds Flugzüüg isch vor Los Angelas i ds Meer gstürzt. Januar 2000 vo Puerto Vallarta z Mexiko nach Seattel i der USA, mit em ne Zwüschestopp z San Francisco gsi. The crew of a SkyWest airliner reported, "He's, uh, definitely out of control. The acme screw did not completely separate from the acme nut during the initial dive because the screw's lower mechanical stop was restrained by the lower surface of the acme nut until just before the second and final dive about 10 minutes later. Individual maintenance tasks (such as the end-play check) were not separately considered in this extension. The investigation concluded that "FAA surveillance of Alaska Airlines had been deficient for at least several years". [23], The investigation then proceeded to examine why scheduled maintenance had failed to adequately lubricate the jackscrew assembly. [16]:6–9 During this time, the flight crew considered, and rejected, any further attempts to correct the runaway trim. About 5 seconds later, the CVR recorded the sound of a series of at least four distinct "thumps." Therefore, the NTSB concluded that "more than just the last lubrication was missed or inadequately performed". All wreckage recovered from the crash site was unloaded at the Seabees' Naval Construction Battalion Center Port Hueneme, California, for examination and documentation by NTSB investigators.
Elytres 5 Lettres, Taux Horaire 2020, Contraintes Du Cantal, Rever D'etre En Couple Avec Quelqu'un Qu'on Connait, Dragon Egg White Ice And Fire, Regarder Le Goût Des Autres En Streaming Gratuit, Thomas Pesquet Site Officiel, Corps D'état Secondaire Pdf, Test Allergie Alimentaire Chien, Le Livre Des Moi,